The best life, the most pleasant life, the life of of perfect happiness (teleia eadaimonia), NE X concludes, is a life devoted to reflection upon or contemplation of (theoria) the eternal verities. Excellence in contemplation is wisdom (sophia). But a life devoted to theoria and sophia is for the most part beyond what a man can achieve, and a life of practicing the other excellences, both of character and intellect, is only in an inferior or derivative sense (deuteros) happy. Thus the brave and temperate and prudent man participate only in an inferior kind of happiness.
We want to consider how Aristotle comes to this paradoxical and pessimistic comclusion, and whether he is in fact driven to it by the logic of his position. Aristotle, we should remember, is deeply committed to reaching a consistent consensus on ethical questions like the nature of happiness and the best life, and this view of happiness, it seems fair to say, outrages consensus. We do not believe that only--or, in fact, not even--the wise man (sophos) is happy because of his limited capacity to contemplate.
I shall not discuss in detail the alternative account of happiness found in the Eudemians, but I shall argue that its view of happiness is at least as eulogon on Aristotelian principles as the view of NE X. (And the Eudemians' view of happiness is a view that can attract consensus.)
Perhaps the clearest way to understand the argument of NE X. vii-viii is to look first at the argument in NE X. viii.7 about the perfect happiness of the gods. Human happinesss aspires to but falls short of divine happiness, and the reasons why we fall short explain the difficulties associated with human flourishing. The gods for Aristotle are pure nous, and as such they are immaterial beings who do not take any actions in the human sense. None of the virtues of character pertain to them since they do not act or create. They are not just or brave or temperate or prudent. The sole activity of the gods whose nature is pure nous is theoria, in which they are continuously and permanent engaged. Their supremely happy state is a life of continuous theoria, which is the only activity befits their nature as pure nous.
Now men aspire to the blissfully happy life of the gods--do they actually, if the gods are construed as pure contemplative beings?--but we are by nature composite or synthetic beings. We have fragile bodies and our soul (psyche) has parts whose activities are derived from and concerned with the body. We have sensations and emotions and part of our reasoning soul must also be devoted to trying to control and direct our emotions and actions. In short, many activity are necessary to our physical (and social) life, and so many skills and excellences are needed if we are to do well and flourish. Theoria and sophia may be the best activity and excellence of which we humans are capable, but we require may other activities just to maintain a life in which theoria is possible.
For the gods their blissful life is a life of practicing the one activity (theoria) essential to their simple nature (pure nous). But for human beings there is not one activity essential to our composite nature. Our nature requires us to do many things. So what does happiness amount to for composite beings like humans? Aristotle conjectures that it is engaging in (as much as possible) the highest activity of which we are capable, namely, theoria.
I say conjectures because the argument of NE X. vii is clearly content with developing one plausible or reasonable (eulogon) hypothesis, and does not consider some obvious alternatives. At the beginning of Chapter vii we read "But if happiness is activity in accordance with excellence, it is reasonable that it should be (activity) in accordance witht the highest activity, and this will be the (activity) of our best part." Well it is eulogon that our happiness as composite being should not ignore the highest virtuous activity of which we are capable (sophia), but it is not as reasonable that our happiness should focus on just one activity (which is not even necessary for life) and ignore all the other virtuous activities of which we are capable and in fact must avail ourselves. Isn't the happiness of a composite being like man dependent upon the joint exercise of all the excellences which his life requires? Then why isn't the happiness of man constitued by the joint exercise of aretai like prudence and making/creating well and discovering and most of the excellences of character like justice and temperance? Aristotle may have an answer to this challenge but it is conspicuously missing from NE X, which fails to consider what I think we must consider the most intuitive alternative. Understand that eulogon typically introduces a conjecture and not a secure inference, for which Aristotle will proceed to offer at most some plausible reasons.
It is interesting that Aristotle in the NE seems to make an exception to his general rule that excellence in any activity lies not pursuing it to excess or deficiently, and at the right time and place, etc. There seems to be obvious situations in which theoria can be pursued at the wrong time and place and too much, to the neglect of a person's position and duties and general well-being. Granting for the moment that theoria is the most pleasurable thing we can engage, but surely it is symptom of poor self-control if a man pursues the pleasures of contemplation while neglecting his duties and his own welfare. Maximizing theoria is not a good idea for a being who has more pressing concerns.
A reasonable amount of theoria in a life that balances other concerns and interests seems a much more plausible Aristotelian formula for complete happiness. Now even if we grant--what most of us do not believe--that theoria is our best and most pleasurable activity, we must allow that most men take pride and pleasure in living prudently, in performing well in their roles and duties, and in creating things. Most of us would in fact say that excellences in these areas are more important and enjoyable to us than theoria (which comprises exactly what). Never mind the game of trying to rank these excellences by importance, on which we will find no consensus. What we can agree upon is that a happy life includes all of the important ones.
This formula is in fact much closer to the Eudemian's account that finds happiness in all virtous activity performed for its own sake. The domain of master virtue of kalokagathia is much more naturally noble actions performed for their own sake than theoria.
Friday 11 July 2008
Euboulia
Euboulia is Aristotle's term for excellence in deliberation. We deliberate well when we arrive at the correct way to pursue something good for us. The Aristotelian text is at NE VI. ix.
The correct way to pursue a worthwhile objective is what we would call the best plan or strategy for doing so. Aristotle, unfortunately, does not say much about planning. His model of deliberation seems to be the simple practical syllogism, which says nothing at all about the correct way to pursue a given objective. Part of the problem, I suspect, is that plans are something we make or construct, and Aristotle is loathe to think of deliberation as an activity that aims to produce something. Yet deliberation is very much about constructing feasible plans. Or, if you wish to slice the decision process into different stages, deliberation is the ultimate (or penultimate) stage of the decision process which selects the best plan from among the alternatives that have been constructed. What we deliberate about when we deliberate are the plans that we have created. If we have created no alternative plans or strategies to pursue an objective, we have nothing to deliberate.
So this is our first basic dissent from Aristotle's notion of euboulia. Euboulia is essentially a productive and creative activity which explores many ways and finally selects the best. The product of delibertion is something physical real, a written plan of action like a home construction schedule incorporating the architect's designs. "Show me your plans" is a reasonable challenge for anyone who professes euboulia.
A second dissent from Aristotle's account of euboulia concerns his classing it as an intellectual excellence and not (as well and as much) an excellence of charcter. In the next book of the NE Aristotle will puzzle over the phenomemon of akrasia, the main species of which is abandoning a well deliberated course of action under emotional pressure or stress. How can this happen, he wonders, and his answer seems to speak about a forgetfulness of some key premise of the deliberation. We can agree that a plan we akratically desert was deficient or defective in some sense such that pressure from the passions could cause it to collapse. But that means that a plan that is subject to collapse was not well made. Akratic failure means the decision maker did not exhibit euboulia. Euboulia does not produce plans that fail to weather predictible emotional stresses.
What Aristotle's account of euboulia completely misses is the key stage in the decision process in which the decision maker anticipates the emotional resistance his best choice may/will provoke and deals with it. Emotion reacts to the costs and risks associated with a plan. Are these under control? Are these acceptable given the importance of what is being pursued? The best plan for achieving some objective is not a plan we should commit to if we have not taken the time to reflect upon what we must put at risk to implement this plan. If we are not sure we should take these risks or that we can cope with them, then we should not proceed. If we doanyway, akratic desertion is all too likely outcome.
For this reason I consider euboulia also an excellence of character, for it necessarily involves a kind of training in toughness to resist fears and desires and other passions. If we do not have the toughness (karteria) to overmaster the fears and temptations that a plan may provoke, that plan is not feasible or practicable for us, whatever other skills and resources we possess in abundance.
The correct way to pursue a worthwhile objective is what we would call the best plan or strategy for doing so. Aristotle, unfortunately, does not say much about planning. His model of deliberation seems to be the simple practical syllogism, which says nothing at all about the correct way to pursue a given objective. Part of the problem, I suspect, is that plans are something we make or construct, and Aristotle is loathe to think of deliberation as an activity that aims to produce something. Yet deliberation is very much about constructing feasible plans. Or, if you wish to slice the decision process into different stages, deliberation is the ultimate (or penultimate) stage of the decision process which selects the best plan from among the alternatives that have been constructed. What we deliberate about when we deliberate are the plans that we have created. If we have created no alternative plans or strategies to pursue an objective, we have nothing to deliberate.
So this is our first basic dissent from Aristotle's notion of euboulia. Euboulia is essentially a productive and creative activity which explores many ways and finally selects the best. The product of delibertion is something physical real, a written plan of action like a home construction schedule incorporating the architect's designs. "Show me your plans" is a reasonable challenge for anyone who professes euboulia.
A second dissent from Aristotle's account of euboulia concerns his classing it as an intellectual excellence and not (as well and as much) an excellence of charcter. In the next book of the NE Aristotle will puzzle over the phenomemon of akrasia, the main species of which is abandoning a well deliberated course of action under emotional pressure or stress. How can this happen, he wonders, and his answer seems to speak about a forgetfulness of some key premise of the deliberation. We can agree that a plan we akratically desert was deficient or defective in some sense such that pressure from the passions could cause it to collapse. But that means that a plan that is subject to collapse was not well made. Akratic failure means the decision maker did not exhibit euboulia. Euboulia does not produce plans that fail to weather predictible emotional stresses.
What Aristotle's account of euboulia completely misses is the key stage in the decision process in which the decision maker anticipates the emotional resistance his best choice may/will provoke and deals with it. Emotion reacts to the costs and risks associated with a plan. Are these under control? Are these acceptable given the importance of what is being pursued? The best plan for achieving some objective is not a plan we should commit to if we have not taken the time to reflect upon what we must put at risk to implement this plan. If we are not sure we should take these risks or that we can cope with them, then we should not proceed. If we doanyway, akratic desertion is all too likely outcome.
For this reason I consider euboulia also an excellence of character, for it necessarily involves a kind of training in toughness to resist fears and desires and other passions. If we do not have the toughness (karteria) to overmaster the fears and temptations that a plan may provoke, that plan is not feasible or practicable for us, whatever other skills and resources we possess in abundance.
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